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____________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.  
Edward Stinson and Juan Jarmon were tried, convicted, 
and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for selling large 
amounts of crack cocaine in a public housing complex. In this 
appeal, they challenge evidentiary decisions, the jury verdicts, 
and their sentences. We will affirm. 
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I 
Stinson and Jarmon each ran drug trafficking 
conspiracies out of the Norman Blumberg Public Housing 
Complex in North Philadelphia at various times between 2010 
and 2015. The Blumberg Complex included some 500 
apartment units in what was intended to be a family-friendly 
environment that included two playgrounds. Unfortunately, 
that aspiration was not realized as the large quantity of drugs 
sold in the Blumberg Complex spurred a joint investigation 
among local police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.  
Government agents put up pole cameras, established 
wiretaps, used confidential informants to make controlled drug 
purchases, pulled trash, analyzed pen registers, and—after 
Stinson’s arrest and subsequent incarceration in 2012—
listened to recordings of Stinson’s phone conversations while 
he was in prison. After authorities completed their 
investigation in February 2017, the grand jury returned two 
indictments. The first charged Stinson and twelve others with 
conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine 
and related crimes. The second charged Jarmon and twelve 
others with similar crimes.1 Most of their co-defendants 
pleaded guilty, but Stinson and Jarmon proceeded to separate 
trials.  
 The trials shared a similar structure. In each, the 
Government called some law enforcement officers to testify 
 
1 Stinson was charged in both indictments, but the Government 
moved to dismiss all charges against him under the second 
indictment after his conviction under the first.  
5 
 
about the investigation. These officers gave general overview 
testimony, explained coded language and investigative 
techniques, and discussed recorded phone calls they reviewed 
as part of the investigation. In one recorded call—made by 
Stinson while in prison—Stinson ceded some of his drug 
territory to Jarmon.  
The Government also called cooperating co-defendants 
who testified against Stinson and Jarmon. These witnesses 
explained the ins and outs of drug dealing at Blumberg. Stinson 
and Jarmon led their conspiracies. Each had his own group of 
sellers and lookouts with set wages and schedules. They used 
the Blumberg Complex apartments as stash houses and from 
there sold crack at all hours of the day.  
Juries convicted Stinson and Jarmon of the conspiracy 
charges and most of the related charges. The District Court 
sentenced each to 360 months’ imprisonment.  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Stinson and Jarmon prematurely 
filed notices of appeal, which we deem timely under Rule 
4(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
 Although Stinson and Jarmon were charged in different 
indictments based on different underlying facts, their appeals 
were consolidated because they raise a common issue: whether 
recordings of phone calls Stinson made from prison were 
admissible at trial. We consider this issue first, and then turn to 
their separate arguments. 
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III 
 Before trial, Stinson moved to suppress recordings of 
phone calls he made while incarcerated. Because one of these 
calls was with Jarmon, Jarmon joined the motion. The District 
Court denied the motion, relying on our opinion in United 
States v. Shavers, where we held inmates and their 
interlocutors have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
phone conversations if they have reason to know the calls are 
monitored. 693 F.3d 363, 390 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on 
other grounds, Shavers v. United States, 570 U.S. 913 (2013). 
We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed 
standard: clear error for factual findings and de novo for issues 
of law. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
 Under Shavers, the motion to suppress had to be denied. 
Upon entering the prison, Stinson received a prisoner 
handbook which explained the facility’s policies, including 
that calls are monitored and recorded. This warning is repeated 
on signs near the facility’s telephones and in a recorded 
message played to both parties before every call. Neither 
Stinson nor Jarmon claim ignorance; they knew the calls were 
monitored and recorded. But they argue Shavers is no longer 
good law and that their calls were protected by the Fourth 
Amendment despite their knowledge of the recordings.  
 The Fourth Amendment protects information in which 
one has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Shavers, 693 
F.3d at 389 (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 
(1986)). This requires the defendant to subjectively believe the 
information is private and for that belief to be objectively 
reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).  
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Until 2018, it was accepted that one could not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
turned over to third parties. See id. at 743–44. The Supreme 
Court altered this “third-party doctrine” in Carpenter v. United 
States, when it held a defendant’s cell-site location information 
(CSLI)—data tracking a cell phone’s physical location that is 
automatically sent by the phone to the cell carrier whenever the 
phone is used—is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 138 S. 
Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
 The Court recognized CSLI is different. Unlike 
ordinary business records, the collection of CSLI by cell 
carriers is “inescapable and automatic” once one decides to 
carry a cell phone. Id. at 2223. The rare combination of 
automated disclosure and “deeply revealing” location 
information prompted the Court to conclude that cell phone 
users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI even 
when it was held by a private third party (a cell phone 
company). Id. at 2223. Stinson and Jarmon ask us to apply 
Carpenter to prison calls.  
 We decline Stinson and Jarmon’s invitation to expand 
Carpenter for two reasons. First, Shavers did not rely on the 
third-party doctrine, so its holding is unaffected by Carpenter. 
Shavers held inmates have no expectation of privacy in their 
phone calls not because the recordings are held by a third party, 
but because of the nature of incarceration. 693 F.3d at 390 n.7. 
Prisoners know they are under constant surveillance. They 
have no general expectation of privacy during their 
incarceration, including in their own cells. Hudson v. Palmer, 
468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984). And the prison’s phone policies 
and warnings to inmates make any subjective expectation of 
privacy even more unreasonable. See Shavers, 693 F.3d at 390 
n.7. That principle applies to both parties on the line. Id. at 
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389–90. A party at liberty (Jarmon) cannot reasonably expect 
his call to be private when he is told that his conversation with 
an inmate (Stinson) is being monitored. Id.  
Even had Shavers relied on the third-party doctrine, 
Carpenter still would not compel a different result. While we 
need not decide how far Carpenter extends to other 
technologies, it does not apply to prison phone calls. Unlike an 
ordinary cell phone user who “in no meaningful 
sense . . . ‘assume[s] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive 
dossier of his physical movements” when he turns on his 
phone, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2220 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 
745), Stinson and Jarmon did assume the risk of surveillance 
here. After being told their calls were monitored, they 
continued to discuss drug trafficking and other criminal acts. 
And unlike CSLI, there is nothing “unique” or technologically 
advanced about prison phone calls that counsels for extending 
the Fourth Amendment to that milieu. Id. 
For these reasons, we hold that Stinson and Jarmon had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone calls. We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s orders denying their 
motion to suppress. 
IV 
 Having rejected Appellants’ request to expand 
Carpenter to prison phone calls, we turn to Stinson’s and 
Jarmon’s particular arguments. 
A 
 Stinson argues the District Court abused its discretion 
in admitting some testimony by FBI Agent Sarah Cardone, the 
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Government’s overview witness. See United States v. Pelullo, 
964 F.2d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 1992). He acknowledges overview 
witnesses may “tell the story of [the] investigation” including 
“how the investigation began, who was involved, and what 
techniques were used.” United States v. Lacerda, 958 F.3d 196, 
208 (3d Cir. 2020). But Stinson claims Agent Cardone went 
too far when she referred to the “Stinson drug trafficking 
group,” Stinson App. 475, told jurors she “learned about the 
trafficking of crack cocaine by Edward Stinson and . . . other 
members of this organization,” Stinson App. 472, and 
described a chart prepared by the prosecution showing the 
Government’s theory of how Stinson’s group was organized.  
We perceive no problem with Agent Cardone’s testimony. 
It “was limited to an account of her investigation, her personal 
observations, and her beliefs of what the evidence showed 
based on what she saw and heard and did.” Larcerda, 958 F.3d 
at 210 (cleaned up). Besides, the District Court’s limiting 
instructions throughout Agent Cardone’s testimony would 
have cured any error. As for the chart, such exhibits are 
allowed when the jury is properly instructed and the chart is 
supported by actual evidence, as was the case here. See United 
States v. Velasquez, 304 F.3d 237, 240 (3d Cir. 2002).  
B 
Stinson and Jarmon separately argue the evidence at 
their trials was insufficient to convict them of conspiracy. 
Although they cite different evidence, the crux of their 
arguments is the same: the Government proved only the 
existence of mini-conspiracies to sell small quantities of crack, 
not overarching conspiracies to sell 280 grams or more. These 
arguments fail because they do not accept the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. See United States v. 
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Mike, 655 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2011). Under that standard, 
there was plenty of evidence for a rational trier of fact to find 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Stinson and Jarmon 
orchestrated multi-year conspiracies that trafficked more than 
280 grams of crack. See id. 
For starters, Appellants recruited people in their 
communities to sell as much crack as possible. These were not 
just buyer-seller relationships. Stinson and Jarmon bought 
crack in bulk to distribute to their sellers who acted as 
employees, not customers. They set schedules and shifts and 
paid regular wages to their subordinates. And co-conspirators 
warned each other about police activity in the Blumberg 
Complex. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 345–47 
(3d Cir. 2002) (finding “interdependency” between co-
conspirators defeated the claim of multiple conspiracies). The 
record shows that Stinson and Jarmon were not merely part of 
large, ongoing criminal enterprises, but that they organized 
them. See id. at 347. 
Stinson focuses heavily on the fact that some members 
of his conspiracy joined at different times while others left and 
returned later. Such behavior is common, which is why this 
Court held long ago that the government “may establish the 
existence of a continuing core conspiracy which attracts 
different members at different times and which involves 
different sub-groups committing acts in furtherance of the 
overall plan.” United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 
1978). That one of Stinson’s co-conspirators went to South 
Carolina for six months, or that Stinson and another co-
conspirator feuded for short periods of time, did not preclude 
the Government from showing Stinson’s participation in a 
single, overarching conspiracy.  
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The evidence also showed that Stinson’s conspiracy and 
Jarmon’s conspiracy each distributed 280 grams or more of 
crack. Besides the argument we just rejected, Stinson and 
Jarmon challenge the total amount of crack sold. The District 
Court addressed these arguments in its order denying 
Appellants’ motions for judgments of acquittal and provided 
an estimate of crack quantities proven by the Government. And 
the trial judge’s conservative calculations still exceeded 280 
grams.  
Stinson claims the District Court erroneously counted 
the same 21 grams of crack three times. We find no record 
support for this claim, but even if we did, the extra 42 grams 
would be unavailing for Stinson because the evidence at trial 
proved his conspiracy sold far more crack than the District 
Court gave it credit for. One of Stinson’s co-conspirators 
mentioned five rocks of crack cocaine the District Court did 
not include in its calculations. Another said he sold crack for 
Stinson over 20 times, but the District Court considered only 
sales from his four highest grossing days. These uncounted 
quantities exceed the challenged 42 grams. 
Jarmon’s arguments on this score are even less 
convincing. One of Jarmon’s sellers said he alone sold more 
than 280 grams of crack while working for Jarmon. This 
testimony sufficed to establish the requisite drug quantities. 
Jarmon also attacks the credibility of Government witnesses 
and questions the chain of custody for the seized drugs. But 
these arguments too are unpersuasive. It was the jury’s 
prerogative to assess the credibility of the Government’s 
witnesses. And the testimony by the DEA agents and chemists 
handling the drugs adequately authenticated the physical 
evidence. See United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 82 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
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For these reasons, we hold the District Court did not 
clearly err in attributing more than 280 grams of crack to 
Stinson and Jarmon at sentencing. See United States v. Grier, 
475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Although 
sentences must be based on drug quantities reasonably 
foreseeable to each individual, USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)(iii), as 
ringleaders, Stinson and Jarmon are responsible for all the 
crack sold by their subordinates to further the conspiracies, see 
United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 219 (3d Cir. 1999). And 
that amount exceeds 280 grams for both Stinson and Jarmon. 
C 
Jarmon claims the evidence was insufficient to convict 
him of several substantive drug offenses charged in counts 7–
18 and 24–33. Counts 7–18 were based on controlled 
purchases of crack directly from Jarmon. He claims the 
evidence was insufficient because the Government cooperators 
who made the purchases were unreliable, the Government lost 
some of the seized drugs, and the chain of custody was spotty 
at times. While these arguments reduce the probative value of 
the Government’s evidence, the videos, photos, and audio 
recordings of Jarmon participating in these sales were enough 
for a jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Counts 24–33, which deal with aiding and abetting drug 
sales, were based on intercepted calls in which Jarmon directed 
customers to his sellers to buy crack. These calls and the 
witness testimony explaining them were sufficient evidence for 
the jury to convict. And the slight discrepancy between when 
the calls occurred and the time charged in the indictment (less 
than an hour) amounts to, at most, a non-prejudicial variance. 
See Real v. Shannon, 600 F.3d 302, 308 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Where 
‘on or about’ language is used, the government is not required 
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to prove the exact dates, if a date reasonably near is 
established.” (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 
1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987))). 
D 
Finally, Stinson and Jarmon dispute some aspects of 
their sentences. Both challenge a leadership enhancement. 
Jarmon alone challenges a violence enhancement, an 
enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, and the 
reasonableness of his sentence for the substantive drug 
charges. 
The District Court did not clearly err in applying any of 
the sentencing enhancements. See United States v. Helbling, 
209 F.3d 226, 242–43 (3d Cir. 2000). Testimony by Stinson 
and Jarmon’s co-conspirators identified them as “the boss” of 
their respective conspiracies. Stinson and Jarmon bought crack 
in bulk, hired and controlled their workers, and kept the lion’s 
shares of the drug proceeds. So we agree with the District Court 
that Stinson and Jarmon were the leaders of their groups. See 
id. at 243 (citing USSG § 3B1.1 app. note 3 (listing factors 
showing leadership including degree of control, scope of 
illegal activity, and claiming the larger share proceeds)). And 
the conspiracies were “extensive” for purposes of the 
leadership enhancement; evidence at trial showed each 
conspiracy had at least five members. See USSG § 3B1.1(a).  
As for Jarmon’s violence and weapon enhancements, 
his own words are the strongest evidence against him. The 
Government introduced an intercepted call where Jarmon 
bragged about punching a female Blumberg resident in the face 
when she threatened to call the police. In another call, he 
admitted to having a gun, which he gave to a co-conspirator, 
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and said he had to get another one. So his argument against the 
violence and weapon enhancements is specious at best. 
Nor do we find Jarmon’s 360-month sentence 
unreasonable. The District Court properly grouped Jarmon’s 
conspiracy count with his substantive drug offenses and 
sentenced him at the bottom of the Guidelines range. See 
USSG § 3D1.2(d). Such sentences are presumptively 
reasonable, United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 331 (3d 
Cir. 2020), and given the scope of Jarmon’s crimes and his past 
criminal history, that presumption is not rebutted here. 
* * * 
 Our review of the extensive District Court records in 
these cases leads us to conclude that the District Court 
committed no errors. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Carpenter cannot reasonably be extended to prison recordings, 
the District Court properly denied the motion to suppress. The 
Court afforded Stinson and Jarmon fair trials, the Government 
carried its burden of proof on the counts of conviction, and the 
sentences were reasonable. Accordingly, we will affirm.  
